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Abstract:
A recent set of case studies on resilience of ecocultures forms the basis for our review of and 
comment on the resilience literature.  We note the diversity of definitions of resilience and the 
confusion this creates in implementing resilience studies and develop a synthesis view that 
establishes  a framework for  defining resilience in an implementable  way.   This  framework 
emphasises the importance of defining the source of and magnitude of shocks as part of the 
definition.  Next, we outline measurement issues, including a variety of performance measures 
that can be used to gauge resilience.  We argue that self-determination and local ownership of 
resources is supported in the cases, and review the effectiveness of the informal insurance 
arrangements  observed  in  the  cases.  We  close  with  the  variables  suggested  by  the  case 
studies  to  include  in  a  resilience  index  and  lessons  for  regional  governments  developing 
resilience policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a basis for policy discussions of resilience at the local 
level. We draw on data from a recent and new set of case studies of resilience of “ecocultures”, 
broadly defined as the system by which a culture is linked with its environment (Pretty, 2011) 
to  study  the  effects  of  a  wide  variety  of  shocks  ranging  from  petrol  price  shocks  to 
environmental change due to global warming to population depletion due to emigration.  We 
unite our findings into a framework for study that should be sufficiently broad to apply to 
resilience discussion beyond ecocultures.  
The paper starts with a definition of what is meant by “resilience” and how it relates to the 
concept of” sustainability”, which also is discussed in the case studies and is linked to resilience  
in many ways.  We find a lack of clarity on the concept in the case studies that reflects an 
enormous spread of definitions used in the literature.  This lack of a common vocabulary not 
only  leads  to  a  lack  of  comparability  across  the  case  studies,  but  also  to  difficulties 
implementing resilience policy locally: if actors cannot be sure of what they are discussing, 
communication  becomes difficult  and  local  policy  poorly  directed.   We note  that  the core 
difference between resilience and sustainability is that resilience refers to the recovery of a 
system from shocks, whereas sustainability refers to maintaining current opportunities into the 
long run future. Although a sustainable system must be resilient to some degree the analysis 
of resilience is not completely subsumed in the analysis of sustainability, as it investigates a 
number of different dimensions, such as the speed of recovery of the system or the depth of 
the dip in performance of the system after a shock.   These aspects are not essential to the 
broader study of sustainability.  As a first element in our framework, we propose a definition of 
resilience that unifies a variety of approaches whilst providing some clarity on the concept.    
Our definition of resilience must be linked to a measure, as resilience by one measure need not  
imply resilience by another.  This raises two fundamental issues. Firstly, measuring resilience 
requires setting some levels of performance to which we will require our system to return after 
experiencing a shock.  Unfortunately, there is no single measure of societal performance that 
has universal support in the economics literature.  A selection of measures will be discussed 
including purely “economic” measures, such as gross national product, broader measures of 
well being such as the human development index, and more recent and subjective measures 
such as happiness.  In the face of this lack of agreement in the literature, local agreement on 
the  measure  of  resilience  needs  to  be  a  cornerstone  of  any  resilience  policy  before  it  is  
implemented locally: if actors are not implicitly using the same measure of performance in 
their definitions, policy support may not be well coordinated. The choice of measure, in turn, 
needs to be rooted in the determinants of local welfare.  The measure is, then, the second 
element of the framework.
A further issue when measuring resilience is that we must state the type of shock – mild or 
severe,  specific  or  broad-based --  to  which we want our system to be resilient.   A social 
system may be resilient to one type of shock but not to another, similar to the way a society 
may perform well on some measures and not others.  Indeed, a feature of the case studies is 
that  one observes that the policies  followed by the ecocultures often are well  designed to 
create resilience to certain threats, but actually make the culture less resilient to other threats: 
a “perverse resilience”, as it  is termed in one of the case studies (Clifton, 2011).  Hence, 
societies may face trade-offs in resilience policies where policy choice must be weighed by an 
evaluation of the likelihood and severity of certain types of threat. While this suggests that we 
need some method of aggregating threats to yield an idea of what we wish our region to be 
resilient to, this does not imply that we must use a method that simply takes the most likely  
threat.  Indeed, precautionary methods such as real options analysis may be more desirable. 
Indeed, all  aggregation methods that we review are imperfect,  but some method must be 
chosen before undertaking any public consultation so that appropriate information is gathered 
to feed into the analytical method.  The choice and measurement of shock is, then, our third 
element.
The second part of the paper considers the factors that come out most clearly in the case 
studies as impacting on local resilience.  We do not limit ourselves to purely economic factors. 
Instead,  while  we  search  for  factors  based  on  economic  analysis,  we  focus  on  broad 
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institutions that tend to promote resilience.  While we identify a large number of factors that 
can affect the resilience of a system, we focus on governance and insurance systems, both 
emphasised in the case studies. We close with our conclusions on a framework for analysis and 
pressure points where local governments can play a key role in promoting resilience.
2 DEFINITION OF RESILIENCE
The definition of resilience has received considerable attention in the economics literature.  We 
will  start  here  with  a  rough  definition  that  we  can  translate  into  measures.  We will  then 
contrast the definition to that of sustainability and move on to discuss some of the subtleties of 
the definition.  These subtleties are important, as they can determine whether we consider any 
particular system resilient or not.  We close with a framework that can be used as a basis for 
discussion in defining resilience as a prelude to policy consultation. 
2.1 Resilience, and Sustainability: The Role of Shocks  
As a first cut, resilience can be defined as the ability of an economy, society, organisation or 
individual to recover effectively from an unexpected shock.  This rough definition of resilience 
raises two related questions: what it means to “recover” and what we mean by an effective 
recovery. An example might help illustrate how the two issues are linked as well as how they 
can be put into practice. Suppose that we only care about economic performance and that we 
take GDP per capita as our sole measure of this performance. The term “recovery” can then be 
made more precise. It might mean to go back to the same level of GDP per capita as before 
the adverse shock, or to reach the same growth rate in GDP per capita as before, or to reach 
the level of GDP per capita that would have prevailed at the same time had the shock not 
occurred. Any one of these, or other GDP levels, including even those lower than before the 
shock might be deemed a “recovery”.  Once we know how to measure “recovery”, measuring 
its effectiveness is relatively straightforward: it would be the shortfall in discounted GDP per 
capita between the time where the shock occurs and the time where recovery is achieved.  In 
other words, once we are willing to establish some measure of performance or “health” of a 
society and a standard of performance for “recovery” to be said to have occurred, we can 
readily translate the definition into measures of effectiveness. 
This example raises a series of issues.  First, resilience is quite distinct from sustainability, 
which has its own extensive literature. While resilience relates to recovery of a system from a 
shock, sustainability relates to the long term trajectory -- or opportunity set -- of a social 
system.  Resilience requires definition of a shock to be applied, whereas sustainability does 
not.   The  cases  that  motivate  this  study  include  examples  that  illustrate  the  distinction 
between “locally sustainable” but “globally non-resilient” systems. The Puruvesi seine fishing 
community  investigated by Mustonen,  2011, describes  a system that  is  sustainable  in  the 
sense that it does not deplete its resources beyond the level at which they renew (so that its 
capital  stocks, including natural  capital,  are not  depleted).   Further,  the society is  able to 
maintain consumption based on these resources potentially indefinitely when taken on its own 
terms. In this sense, it illustrates a locally sustainable system.  On the other hand the case 
also  shows  that  the  same  system  is  not  resilient  to  the  shock  of  changing  outside 
opportunities,  especially  for  youth.   Indeed,  emigration  appears  to  be  a  major  threat 
endangering the culture, as the study reports that there are no young seine fishermen at all in 
the community.  Extinction is, then, a real threat when the shock of exposure occurs despite 
the sustainability of the system when not subjected to this shock.       
2.2 Discounting:  Resilience and Weight on the Short Term
Our  evaluation  of  resilience  depends  on the  term of  our  analysis.   Referring  to  our  GDP 
example and postulating a set of growth trajectories illustrated in  Figure 1 below we have 
systems A and D which are differently resilient, but neither is necessarily more resilient than 
the other: our answer depends on whether resilience is defined as the depth of the dip in 
performance or the total discounted cost incurred during the dip.  Further, A and D have the 
same long run performance so that in the long term there is little difference between the two. 
B is subject to more frequent dips (perhaps because it is susceptible to a greater variety of 
cresi.essex.ac.uk Page 6 of 29 © 2012, University of Essex
CRESI WORKING PAPER
CWP-2012-01-Econ-Analysis-Resillience.doc
shocks but is more resilient to each one) so that it is, again, “differently” resilient.  B also has  
lower long run performance.  C suffers from no short term shocks at all but has the lowest long 
run performance.  Hence, it is the most resilient of the systems in the short term, but has the 
worst  long run performance characteristics.   Indeed, if  a minimum level of performance is 
necessary for sustainability, this system may not be sustainable at all.  For policy purposes, we 
need some basis for discussion to decide whether A, B, C or D would be the optimal policy or 
design for our system.  
Figure 1
We need to have a guide on how much weight to allocate to the shorter or longer term in order 
to make such a policy choice.  When we review the variety of definitions of resilience in the 
literature, however, we note that some focus purely on the long term viability of a system 
while others include some weight on shorter term viability.  For example, extinction as opposed 
to short term fluctuations is the focus of the definition of Holling, 1973.  Indeed, in this sense, 
the definition is more in line with what appears as sustainability in the economics literature and  
would single out trajectory C as perhaps the least “resilient” despite its short term stability. 
On the other hand, Perrings’, 2006, definition of resilience as “the ability of the system to 
withstand  either  market  or  environmental  shocks  without  losing  the  capacity  to  allocate 
resources efficiently or to deliver essential services” leaves the term of analysis indeterminant. 
Clearly, however, we need a more precise sense of the weight that the shorter term will play in 
our decision process if we are to choose among policies leading to paths A, B, C, or D.
To resolve this, we note that under any positive weight given to current generations, we are 
potentially  concerned  with  both  long  and  short  term performance.  Indeed,  if  the  time  to 
recovery is infinite, then the system is neither sustainable nor resilient from the point of view 
of the actors taking the decision today.  This just states the implicit current state of play in 
policy: for example, all current policy suggestions on human population control as a means 
towards sustainable or resilient ecological systems takes current human well-being and human 
rights into account as a matter of law. This does not filter through into all the literature on the 
definition of resilience,  however, nor does it  filter  through to a precise weight to  apply in 
economic analysis to shorter versus longer term policy.  Indeed, economic analysis does not 
provide the tools to specify a single “right” discount rate.  Instead, the precise weight must be 
the subject of discussions that establish a framework for resilience policy and can only be the 
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fruit of open consultation.  We are left, then, with little direction from the literature but with  
implicit  weight given to current generations’  well  being in practice.   What is  needed is an 
explicit time frame given to policy so that all participants are on the same page in developing 
policy responses.          
Holling and others draw a distinction between stability and resilience, where stability refers to 
(short  term) fluctuations  of  a  system such as the system’s  population,  whereas resilience 
refers  to  the  (long  term)  persistence  of  the  ecosystem  itself  to  retain  its  functional 
characteristics.  Hence, a resilient system can still fluctuate greatly in the short term where we 
have low stability in the face of long term resilience.  Common and Perrings, 1992, translate 
this  distinction  into  economic  modelling,  suggesting  that  stability  refers  to  fluctuations  in 
variables and resilience refers  to constant parameters  of  a system.  Our view is  that this 
distinction  is  not  crucial  to  economic  modelling.   If  we accept  the Common and Perrings 
interpretation then this distinction is actually just a modelling choice: it is up to the modeller to 
determine what will be parameterised and what will be left as variable in any economic study. 
The choice is determined by the focus of the study: what is left variable usually is the focus of  
the  model  and the behaviour  of  that  variable  is  the reason  for  conducting  the modelling 
exercise.  If we are interested in the characteristics or function of a system, as we might be in 
a resilience study à la Holling, then the stability of variables relating to the system’s integrity 
and  functioning  would  be  the focus  of  our  modelling  (and would  appropriately  be  left  as 
variable rather than parameterised).  Hence, stability and resilience are not distinct concepts in 
Hollings’ sense in economic modelling and need not be made.  What is distinct is whether one 
focuses on the short or the long term or on both, as we discussed above.  Economics itself is 
agnostic about the focus, potentially allowing for a weight to be placed on either term and 
potentially  allowing  any  aspect  of  a  system  to  be  a  variable  of  interest.   The  role  of 
government is clear, however, in that it is the facilitator of the process that determines the 
time frame to be used in resilience policy based on local preferences and social welfare.    
2.3 Performance versus Structural Evaluation
Our example, above, of GDP measurement is an interpretation of resilience based on an output 
or performance measure rather than on the structural features of the system underlying that 
measure.  We defined “recovery” in a way that leaves our measure of systemic “health” (GDP 
per capita in the example) at its original level but allows the underlying system to look rather 
different after the shock: while the performance measure may have recovered to earlier levels, 
that performance may be derived from an evolved social system.  This performance view is 
consistent with the idea of introducing important changes to societies to improve the stability 
of their livelihoods via projects to diversify food sourcing methods or energy production.      
On the other hand, Walker et al, 2004, have defined resilience as “the capacity of a system to 
absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change, so as to retain essentially the 
same function,  structure,  identity  and feedbacks.”   Hence, this definition encompasses the 
stability  of  a  structure,  rather  than  focus  purely  on  the  performance  outcomes  of  that 
structure.  
Indeed,  looking  across  the  case  studies,  one  sees  that  “ecoculture  resilience”  has  been 
understood in a variety of ways.  Sedlmayer and Boehm, 2011, Accorigi, 2011, and Bunting et 
al, 2011, consider environmental management projects that build maintenance of consumption 
and income in the face of threats such as oil price shocks.  These implicitly consider resilience 
as a measure of human performance (consumption, in particular).   Vihar and Doon, 2011, 
Cullen-Unsworth,  2011,  and  Hayashi,  2011,  view  (ecoculture)  resilience  as  persistence  of 
cultural properties that represent the combined works of man and nature.  These three studies 
view resilience as the maintenance of a co-evolving system of humans and their environment, 
although both take a performance measure, the well-being of the humans, as one outcome of 
interest.   Qingwen  and  Li,  2011,  and  aspects  of  Clifton,  2011,  examine  more  narrowly 
ecological resilience, and focus on the importance of knowledge as a means of adaptation to 
shock rather  than on resilience  per  se.   Finally,  Mustonen,  2011,  focuses  on a  particular 
technology (seine fishing),  a  structural  characteristic.   A common thread is  that  resilience 
refers  to  maintenance  of  some  variable,  but  this  may be  a  performance  measure  or  the 
structure of a system or sub-system or even a mix of both.  Hence, we need to decide for 
policy discussion whether resilience will  refer to a performance or a structural  outcome or 
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whether positive weight will be placed on both.
The case study of Uttarakhand (Vihar and Doon, 2011) points to an interesting subtlety of this 
choice.  Two valleys faced with climate change are contrasted, one of which has moved away 
from agriculture into other income sources, modified agricultural practices significantly, and 
exploited transport routes to integrate into the rest of Indian society to effect a large scale 
transformation in the livelihood of the valley.  The other valley has kept its traditional crops 
and agrarian focus but draws on government support to maintain this structure with acceptable  
levels of  consumption.  Which of these valleys has been more resilient?  In this case, the 
authors point  out  that  one would not  want  to  identify societies  that  adapt significantly  to 
change as non-resilient.  In other words, we should not interpret the definition of resilience as 
implying that the system itself should remain unchanged. Surely the ability of a system to 
change itself without unnecessary upheavals in the face of external shock must be part of any 
sensible notion of resilience.  One would like a definition of resilience to include those societies 
that are plastic, as long as the change occurs in an orderly and incremental fashion1.  On the 
other  hand,  if  we define the function  of  the society  as being anything  other  than simply 
maintaining the well-being of the populous, then one of these two valleys may have lost its  
“function” by essentially extinguishing its previous ecoculture.  Any weight placed on structure, 
often introduced via an attempt to capture the “function” of a society, may tend to make a 
rigid response look more resilient than a large adaptation.  
The authors of  this  case study discuss well-being measures of the populations of  the two 
valleys, pointing out that the valley with the rigid response also is the valley with the lower 
levels of well-being (measured by a variety of performance outcomes including satisfaction 
levels as well as development measures).  Indeed, economic modelling, based as it is on a 
utilitarian philosophy, usually takes performance measures as the outcome of interest.  In this 
sense, economics takes performance as “trumping” any functional or structural characteristic. 
Taking  a  performance  measure  as  the  basis  for  evaluation  automatically  incorporates 
adaptability into an economic study of resilience although some outcomes of interest, such as 
distributional  issues,  could  be  incorporated  into  performance  but  generally  are  not.   The 
argument to place full weight on performance measures, whatever those are, is, then, that any 
weight  given  to  structural  measures  rules  out  large  adaptations  that  may  be  desirable 
responses to certain types of shock.     
An alternative method of incorporating adaptability into the analysis is presented by Perrings, 
1998, who suggests that a system is resilient if it maintains its basic organisation in the face of 
exogenous  shocks  without  undergoing  “catastrophic,  discontinuous  change”.   While  this 
definition places more emphasis on structure than might be consistent with an implementation 
of  adaptability,  it  does  add  to  the  definition  that  the  nature  of  the  change  may  be  the 
determinant of resilience, rather than the presence of change.  Note that the nature of change 
can be accommodated with an output measure, as measuring whether change is catastrophic 
or not would necessarily be related to the cost of change, both psychological and physical. 
Hence, the cost of change can be viewed as an alternative formulation of performance.  In 
terms of measuring the cost of  change,  in the simple GDP example presented above, the 
discounted value of GDP per capita lost during the period of recovery was a natural measure 
incorporating both the speed of recovery and the consequences of failure of a system. 
The study of Greenland by Hayashi, 2011, and the study of Bangladesh by Bunting et al, 2011, 
identify  a role  for  governmental  bodies in  the introduction of  new features that  allow the 
society to adapt in the face of environmental change.  In other words, one primary role for 
government is to identify changes and ensure that they do not occur in a catastrophic manner. 
The  interventions  in  the  cases  take  the  form  of  introducing  new  techniques  of  earning 
livelihood (techniques of  hunting new species in  the case of  Greenland and techniques  in 
agriculture  and  aquaculture  in  the  case  of  Bangladesh).   Clifton,  2011,  identifies  the 
government’s  role  in  sedentarisation of the Bajau,  intended as a way of integrating these 
basically nomadic people into the mainstream of Indonesian society, but instead resulting in 
significant social exclusion.
1 Notice that this is related to the discussion of separate concepts of adaptability and transferability in Walker et al 
(2004).  Adaptability as a separate concept is particularly well illustrated in the study by Mustonen et al (2011). 
Notice that the knowledge base – its extent and the technology by which it is accumulated and  maintained  -- is 
illustrated in a number of the case studies, including Mustonen et al, Mustonen, and Clifton, all 2011.  Knowledge is  
viewed as the wellspring of adaptability in this optic.
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Which performance measure is more appropriate depends in part on the question policy wishes 
to  answer  with  the resilience study.   We answer  the  question  of  “If  we wish  to  maintain 
performance under stress, in what way and by how much will society need to change?” or  “If 
we subject the society to stress, what will the cumulative cost be before the society reaches a 
new state of stability in both performance and structure?” then a cost of adjustment outcome 
would be appropriate.  If we wish to answer “If we subject a given societal structure to stress,  
by how much will performance suffer?” then we would take the performance of our measure of 
well-being as our focus.
2.4 A Synthesis
In sum, we are faced with a variety of points that need to be specified in order to develop 
resilience policy: we need to define a term of analysis, outcome measures that we target, and 
a measure of the nature of change.  One way to achieve this could be to require that any 
definition of resilience comprise three elements: what one cares about (i.e.  what is  worth 
preserving or returning to), the type of shock with respect to which resilience is assessed, and 
a metric telling us how effectively the system maintains or returns to what one cares about 
after  a  shock  is  experienced.  For  example,  one  might  care  about  infant  mortality,  study 
resilience with respect to tsunamis, and measure the performance of the system in terms of 
the loss of well-being (e.g. extra infant mortality) over the period required to return to what 
has been defined as a “recovery level”.  The measure could include an element of the cost of 
abrupt change in order to incorporate the idea that the nature of change – catastrophic or 
gradual – affects whether we consider a system resilient or not.  
A  distinction  of  this  approach  is  that  we  place  considerable  emphasis  on  identifying  the 
source(s) of the shock(s). Identifying the source of the shock is surprisingly rare in applied 
work on resilience.  It is our focus because we wish to take a management perspective on the 
ecoculture, rather than an ex post perspective: if we wish to be able to manage the system so 
as  to  generate  resilience,  we  need  to  know  which  measures  to  undertake.   Since  the 
appropriate measures tend to be specific to the type of shock, we need to be able to prioritise. 
We return to methods of prioritising later in the paper.  For the moment, we merely signal the 
importance of the source of the shock as part of the definitional framework.       
Further, notice that the integrity of the system itself will  play no role in our assessment of 
resilience, although the cost of change does.  Indeed, this approach implies that we should 
only care about retaining the “function, structure, identity and feedbacks” of the system if 
these have (performance) value in themselves.  In other words, the list of what one cares 
about  as  outcome  measures  defines  the  list  of  elements  we must  return  to:  the  precise 
elements are not integral to the definition itself and will change depending on the priorities and 
preferences of the region itself.  The definition is a priori agnostic about how flexible or rigid 
we are in defining what we are to return to compared to the original “base” structure we 
evaluate.   As  such,  it  hopefully  captures  a  broad  spectrum  of  interpretations  of  what 
“resilience” can mean.  
Applying this approach to a particular definition of resilience, consider the intriguing economic 
study of regional resilience conducted by Musson, 2011.  She defines regional resilience for her 
study to mean “maintaining or enhancing the attractiveness of [a] territory [to private firms]” 
as a means of generating sustainable development.  This definition has the advantage that it is 
implementable and clear for policy makers what method is to be used to achieve resilience. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  does  not  specify  the  term of  analysis,  the  (outcome)  measure  of 
sustainability for policy evaluation, the cost of change to be considered, or the type of shock 
that  could  affect  attractiveness or sustainability.   In  the interviews conducted of  business 
leaders later in the study,  the paper points out that uncertainty about the sense in which 
sustainability is meant, the cost of alternative policies, and the type of shock to be faced colour  
the responses.  Indeed, the responses are difficult to compare and analyse partly due to this. 
A similar  lack of clarity dogs the case studies that are the data for this paper.   What we 
attempt is a template to ensure clarity of implementation so that more can be gleaned from 
these resilience analyses.      
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3 MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA, THRESHOLD EFFECTS AND PATH 
DEPENDENCE
If we push our definition further to consider how to implement mathematically a definition of 
“resilience”, we find two additional concerns: those of threshold effects and path dependence. 
Even if  we do not wish to  construct  a  mathematical  model,  policy  discussion surrounding 
resilience will need to address these concerns in order to obtain desirable consequences from 
policy interventions.  
Most  economic  modelling  is  equilibrium  modelling.   Equilibrium  is,  roughly  speaking,  the 
behaviour that a system “tends towards” if there are no shocks.  If a system has a stable  
equilibrium, then it will tend to move back towards the same behaviour even after a shock.  
Hence, stability could be interpreted as a general mathematical implementation of the concept 
of “resilience”, which can be translated directly into formal economic modelling.  
This  interpretation  would  be  too  hasty,  however.   Another  important  aspect  of  economic 
equilibrium  is  that  of  uniqueness.  An  economic  or  social  system  may  not  have  a  single 
equilibrium.    For example, economists have studied so called “poverty traps” where a country 
may get caught in  a “bad equilibrium” even though the underlying fundamentals  are also 
compatible with a “good equilibrium” where the economy escapes poverty into development. 
Hence,  a  single  social  structure  can  be  compatible  with  several  different  behavioural  and 
performance outcomes.  The social system can be at equilibrium in several states, but one of 
the states is  more desirable from a performance standpoint.  As each of these equilibria is 
stable, the system would always return to its initial equilibrium following small external shocks. 
On the other hand, a sufficiently large shock can push a system from one equilibrium to the 
other, making the system return not to the original equilibrium but to a new state 2.  
If we stick to a narrow interpretation of “resilience as stability of the original equilibrium”, we 
have several problems.  First, a move in response to stress from the less desirable to the more 
desirable equilibrium could be seen as a lack of resilience. Such an approach would not make 
much sense if we wish to allow for improved performance as an outcome for a resilient society. 
This suggests that resilience should not be defined in terms of a specific equilibrium but in 
terms  of  some  measure  of  performance  that  can  be  compared  across  equilibria,  where 
behaviour can differ considerably between the equilibria. This allows upwards movements in 
performance to be distinguished from downward movements, with resilience policy aiming at 
more  restriction  of  downward  movement.   This  is  consistent  with  the  general  approach 
implicitly  taken by the case studies  in  this  project:  the authors  and the members  of  the 
societies studied do not seem to be concerned that their lives are improving too much.  Rather, 
they are concerned solely with reductions in well-being.      
 Multiple equilibria can also mean that a system might be highly resilient to small shocks but 
very non-resilient to large shocks.  This could be the case if  a system exhibited threshold 
effects (so that small shocks had little effect on the equilibrium but large shocks caused the 
equilibrium to change).  Both of these features are common in economic models of the effects 
of environmental change3 as well as policy discussions of climate change.  For example, the 
effects  for  Europe  of  a  cessation  of  the  Gulf  Stream accompanying  a  global  temperature 
increase could be dramatically different from the effects of a change in global temperature 
without a Gulf Stream effect.  As part of the specification of the  source of the shock on a 
system that we discussed above, we should then add that any specification of resilience must 
include the magnitude of the shock since policies may be specific to magnitudes as well.  We 
will return specifically to the distinction between resilience to large versus small shocks when 
we discuss insurance, below.    
As Bruneau  et al, 2003, point out, a further important issue with multiple equilibria is the 
speed and path of adjustment of a system from one equilibrium to another, not just the change 
2 This is similar to the Walker  et al, 2004, concept of the “latitude” of a system: the degree to which it can be  
perturbed and still return to the original state.  The difference between latitude and our point about stability is our 
emphasis that the original state is not necessarily the desirable one: our view is that the concern about “latitude” is  
not symmetric: policy wishes to restrict downward and not upward movements. 
3See for example, Wu  et al, 2000, where sufficient cumulative conservation is necessary to 
overcome threshold effects  to obtain desirable environmental  enhancement.  See Perrings, 
2006, for discussion of the dimensions of resilience and the role of threshold effects.   
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in equilibrium itself.   In other words, the adjustment process itself  may have desirable or 
undesirable  features,  regardless  of  the final  performance level  at  the equilibria.   The first 
concern echoes Perrings’, 1998, concerns outlined above, that the features of this adjustment 
path can affect the type of policy change we recommend, as the transition period from one 
equilibrium  to  another  might  need  to  be  supported  with  policies  to  ease  the  adverse 
performance consequences of change.  A second and more novel concern about adjustment is 
that the equilibrium of a system may be path-dependent, where decisions from the past may 
limit the features of the equilibrium one can have in the future.  In other words, the transition 
process itself can affect the nature of the equilibrium that is finally attained, making the final 
state sensitive to inter-rim decisions4.  Hence, any policy decision on how to intervene needs to 
evaluate the short term conditions that can shape long term outcomes: even if one takes a 
very long term perspective on resilience, then, one cannot ignore short term behaviour in any 
sense.
Summarising,  then,  a  resilience  study  needs  to  be  sensitive  to  the  presence  of  multiple 
equilibria.   While focussing on performance measures can overcome certain problems with 
multiple  equilibria,  threshold  effects  may  imply  that  distinct  analyses  for  large  and  small 
shocks must be conducted.  Finally, path dependence can imply that short term analysis must 
form part of the study, as the short term behaviour and policies can limit long term attainable 
states.  
4 MEASURING RESILIENCE: DEFINING GOALS AND 
SOURCES OF SHOCKS
If we take the performance perspective discussed above in order to measure resilience we 
need some standard of performance (or “health”) to which we wish our system to return after 
a shock.  The case studies in this project illustrate the possibility of using single-dimensional 
economic measures (such as income or consumption, as in Sedlmayer and Boehm, 2011, or 
Accorigi, 2011) or environmental measures (as in Qingwen and Li, 2011).  Such an approach 
could be misleading, however, as societal performance may be highly multidimensional.  
Many multi-dimensional indices have been proposed. For example, the Human Development 
Index,  used  by  the United  Nations  Development  Programme as  a  measure  of  well-being, 
includes measurements of real income, lifespan and education5.  The HDI index is relatively 
well correlated with subjective well-being for a broad variety of countries6, where subjective 
well-being has been measured in a variety of ways.  Reviewing a large number of papers,  
Blanchflower  and  Oswald,  2011,  broadly  suggest  that  subjective  well-being  defined  as 
“happiness” can be measured as a function of age, gender, income, education, marital status, 
diet,  other  personal  characteristics,  regional  characteristics,  and  country  characteristics. 
Hence, happiness is a composite measure reflecting a large number of societal features.  High 
levels of measured happiness also correlate relatively well with low societal inequality, high 
social capital and strong friendship networks, low unemployment and inflation, high levels of 
democracy and democratic participation, high levels of trust, strong welfare states and public 
spending and low pollution7.
Blanchflower and Oswald point out, however, that no clear  causal link has been established 
between  societal  correlates  and  happiness.  In  other  words,  while  happiness  seems to  be 
related to whether one eats a diet rich in fruit and vegetables, it is not clear that forcing us all  
to become vegetarians would actually cause our measured happiness to rise.  Hence, the point 
here is  two fold.  First,  the performance measure we choose will  determine how systems 
appear to fare in terms of resilience.  Second, since societal characteristics relate to well-being 
as correlations and not causations, it is not clear how we should “engineer society” in order to 
obtain higher resilience based on such a measure.   Indeed, for policy purposes the choice of 
4 See, for example, Havrylyshyn, 2001, and citations within.
5 (See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ for more detail).
6 There is rough positive correlation between the human development index and some measures of subjective well-
being.  See Johnson, 2010 (figure 2).   Some discussion complementary to Blanchflower and Oswald, 2011, on the 
measurement of subjective well-being also is available in this paper.
7 Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) have used blood pressure measurements to attempt to find a good and easily  
measurable proxy for levels of happiness.
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an index such as happiness may not be very useful: if we cannot control it by clear policy 
levers, then its use in a study will not yield any useful policy recommendations.  
Bruneau  et  al,  2003,  comment  that  the  measure  of  resilience  can  potentially  be  multi-
dimensional,  where  they  consider  reduced  probability  of  failure  of  a  system,  reduced 
consequences of failures -- should they occur -- and reduced time to recover from failure as 
three dimensions. In practice, then, we might measure “resilience” by an index that weighs 
each  aspect  of  resilience  and  combines  them  into  an  overall  aggregate.   We  might,  for 
example, measure performance and structural change and the degree of both as well as some 
concept of  the dislocation that  has occurred along the adjustment path.   Each receives a 
weight,  determined  by  preferences  of  the  region,  and  as  diagnosed  by  the  policy-maker. 
Alternatively, we might care about only a single aspect, such as social  wellbeing, but that 
aspect might not be the same in all societies or in all time periods.  For example, while health 
concerns were the sole motivating force behind the Clean Air Act in the United States in the 
early 1970s, current debate on this legislation takes into account other considerations.  In 
other words, some dimensions might receive a weight of zero, but this weight may change 
over time as policy revisions occur and societal preferences change.  Clearly, the choice of 
weights can also affect whether a society appears resilient or not.  
Note that  local  resilience  policy  may have substantial  externalities  to  other  regions.   This 
means that the choice of preference of one region may constrain the choices available to 
another.  Where such externalities exist, coordinated choice across regions is appropriate in 
both the choice of goals and weights.  To return to the case of clean air, externalities can be far 
more significant than in the case of land contamination.  Hence, the degree of externalities 
determines the degree of regional control over resilience policy, and will tend to vary with the 
type of variable resilience policy is addressing.  There is no “one size fits all” recommendation 
on where resilience policy should be seated.  
The other crucial input we need for our measurement of resilience is some measure of the type 
of  threat  faced  by a community  so that  we know the nature of  the shocks  to  which the 
community needs to be resilient.  Let us take the example of organic food. There may be a 
presumption  that,  because  it  reduces  a  community’s  ecological  footprint,  moving  from 
“modern”  to more traditional  or organic  methods also increases “resilience”. This  might  or 
might  not  be  true  depending  on  the  mechanism through  which  organic  food  promotes 
resilience. For example, one could argue that, by reducing dependence on chemical products 
that are imported, organic farming makes the community more resilient to unexpected shocks 
in  international  transport  prices,  changes  in  exchange  rates,  or  even  politically  motivated 
embargoes. On the other hand it might be that organic farming is actually more vulnerable to 
sudden infestations of pests that are, for example, new to a region.  Hence while organic 
farming could perform well in the face of oil price shocks, it could perform poorly in the face of  
the appearance of a new species due to climate change.  The point is that to the extent that a 
policy is specific to certain types of threat, any given policy has the potential drawback of 
creating “perverse resilience” in  the sense of creating a society that is  very stable in one 
sense, which could be an advantage in response to certain threats but a disadvantage when 
faced with other circumstances.  Clifton’s 2011 study of the Bajau proposes the term “perverse 
resilience”, in fact, when referring to the society’s focus on subsistence in the face of a need to 
undertake marine management for  the longer term in order to sustain the sea’s ability to 
support their way of life.  
In order to perform social engineering for -- or to simply evaluate -- resilience, we need some 
way of  combining  these  mechanisms  into  a  global  evaluation  of  a  policy  that  may affect 
resilience with respect to different types of shocks and through several mechanisms at once. 
This is necessary because policy-makers face the daunting task of deciding on which way we 
need to organise our society before knowing exactly which threats we will face in the future. 
An index of the threats likely to face a community, weighted by their probabilities would be one  
approach to this. 
Of course the probabilities would need to be assessed.  Accorigi et al, 2009, aptly summarises 
a wide variety of  techniques to put rough numbers on these probabilities,  incorporating a 
variety of stakeholders.  A key point in Accorigi et al’s discussion is how complex, fragile, time 
consuming and costly these techniques are to implement.  If one is serious about evaluating 
resilience of a society, this is a venture that takes time and resources.  Indeed, one of the 
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points one could draw from their paper is that the time and resource constraints accompanying 
real  policy debate often do not allow for these techniques to be implemented in a full  or 
desirable way.  Given how broad the concept of resilience is, how complex it is to evaluate, and 
the  likely  lack  of  agreement  on  measures  and  goals  of  resilience  analyses  one  could  be 
sceptical about whether any quantitative evaluation of resilience relying on these techniques 
would be conducted in general in any more than a cynical way8.  Recalling the Musson, 2011, 
study cited above, qualitative techniques may be more enlightening but only if the framing of 
the resilience issue is sufficiently well-defined.       
On a more positive and perhaps constructive note, a point that is not emphasised in Accorigi’s 
review  is  the  role  of  real  options  analysis  in  such  quantitative  evaluations  as  a  way  of 
incorporating  policy  responses  to  small  probability  but  catastrophic  events9.   As  small 
probability  catastrophic  events  may  be  of  particular  concern  in  resilience  work,  any 
quantitative analysis would be well-advised to exploit such techniques.  As has been pointed 
out  in  the  literature,  real  options  analysis  has  the  qualitative  effect  of  introducing 
precautionary concerns into policy evaluation.  
5 GOVERNANCE
Suppose  that,  using  Accorigi’s  techniques  for  organising  public  debate  and  defining 
preferences, we have decided on the question we wish to ask of our resilience study,  the 
resultant definition of resilience and the consequent performance standards we wish to use to 
judge the system, and we have identified the likely sources of shocks and the term of analysis. 
What sort of policy levers will we likely need to use to manage resilience of a society?  Can 
economic theory combined with the case studies give us a hint of the aspects of society that 
might  generate  resilience  or  reduce  resilience?    These  aspects  would  form input  to  the 
construction of a model and a policy response for resilience.  To use the terminology of the 
literature, while Walker et al, 2004, specify adaptability and transferability as “precursors” of 
resilience,  can economic  analysis  help  us  to  be  more  specific  about  the sources  of  these 
precursors?  How would the contribution of economics compare to and add to the discussion 
from other social sciences?
The economic approach to resilience would share many common themes with the analysis of 
specialists from other fields. In particular, any microeconomic analysis of resilience would put 
significant emphasis on the issue of governance. Hence the economic and social institutions of 
the affected communities – whether formal or informal – are of the utmost importance in 
assessing their resilience. 
Within  the  broad  area  of  governance,  there  are  several  dimensions  that  affect  resilience 
particularly and have been themes in the economics literature.  First, as a general principle, 
there will be a trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation: centralisation allows for 
better coordination of the community’s reaction but, especially under some types of shocks like 
natural disasters, it suffers when communication networks break down so that assimilating 
locally relevant information becomes time consuming. This  trade off  already suggests that 
different  types  of  governance  confer  greater  resilience  to  different  types  of  shocks.  For 
example, one might believe that decentralised systems would perform better (initially at least) 
in  case  of  localised  natural  disasters,  while  a  more  centralised  system  might  be  better 
equipped to deal with a widescale crisis. The reason for this is several-fold.  One, already 
mentioned, is that decision makers need the complete information to tailor their decisions to 
the actual circumstances they face.  Another is that the two types of crises have different 
contagion properties, which also must be managed: a local natural disaster might be contained 
quite  readily  if  each  region  was  self-sufficient.   Where  contagion  occurs  rapidly  due  to 
connectedness  of  regions,  a  centralised  response  system  can  control  the  broader  effects 
quickly  as different  regions  can be coordinated.   Clifton’s  2011 Bajau study points  to  the 
advantages and disadvantages of the insular nature of the Bajau community in the face of 
various threats.  Specifically, in the face of the generalised threat of environmental (marine) 
8 Accorigi et al (2009) chapters 2-4 particularly go through stakeholder analysis, methods of achieving participation at 
the  local  level,  and  methods  of  building  scenarios.   Chapter  5  goes  through  evaluation  techniques,  including 
computable general equilibrium and cost benefit analysis.  
9 See Perman, 2003, for discussion.
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degradation, there is an inability to mobilise generally to incorporate external ideas that would 
allow the community to create a quick and effective response.  Finally, when responding to a 
widespread threat,  a hierarchical  system can be quicker than a decentralised or otherwise 
egalitarian system.  Again, the Bajau study cites egalitarianism as creating a barrier to both a 
quick and effective response to an external and widespread threat to the marine environment. 
Supporting  a  point  we  made  earlier,  these  suggest  that  connections  between  regions  in 
resilience decision-making and policy need to be shock-specific and multi-level.  
Second, there would be a similar trade-off between rigid social/economic institutions, which 
are good in ensuring commitment to certain fixed goals or values, and more flexible ones that 
might be better at adaptation to unusual or unanticipated circumstances.  Indeed, one of the 
issues  mentioned  in  the  three  northern  case  studies  that  underlie  this  paper  (Hayashi, 
Mustonen et al, and Mustonen, all 2011) as well as the Bhaghirathi valley case study (Vihar 
and Doon, 2011) is that the threat facing each of these communities is the unpredictability and 
novelty of weather patterns created by climate change.  The system in place to respond to 
threats in each case is an oral tradition rooted in experience-based knowledge, which equips 
these  communities  well  to  uphold  their  values  in  the  face  of  threats  that  have  been 
encountered before, but does less well in equipping the group to face novel challenges.  The 
method of incorporating a wider set of tools into the knowledge base is weak, creating lack of 
flexibility of response, even though the existing system is both well-tailored and sufficiently 
flexible to create resilience to historical threats.   Again, no “one size fits all” recommendation 
emerges: depending on the type of threat a relatively rigid and “closed” system or a rather 
flexible and “open” one is appropriate.  A multi-level response is then indicated. 
5.1  Local Ownership and Property Rights
Interestingly,  the  case  studies  underlying  this  paper  emphasise  a  particular  governance 
structure  fairly  consistently:  that  of  self-determination  and  local  ownership  and control  of 
resources.  The primacy of ownership and control and its ability to generate efficient outcomes 
in a decentralised way without government intervention receives support from the economic 
literature based on two theoretical concepts: the Coase Theorem suggests that decisions on 
how resources should be managed can be decentralised to individual private parties and will 
lead to efficient use of the resource (i.e. use that maximizes the resources net benefits, taken 
to be defined broadly to include monetary and non-monetary benefits); Principal-Agent theory 
suggests that maximizing benefits can require delegating power as well  as ownership to a 
party that internalizes the full  set of benefits and information about a resource.  Both the 
Coase Theorem and Principal-Agent theory do recommend government intervention in some 
circumstances,  so  that  we can use  both  theories  to  diagnose  why and  when government 
intervention could be needed.        
First, consider local ownership – in other words decentralisation of the decisions on how to 
manage local resources -- as a mechanism to achieve resilience, or more generally to achieve 
some target in desired resource management.  In a case where use of a resource by one party 
can degrade or deplete the resource available to other parties, or where the resource is a 
public good, the resource tends to be subject to over-use when it is not wholly owned by a 
private party.  For example, if a fishery can be exploited by multiple parties, each of whom 
extracts from the fishery so as to only take into account its own private benefits, then that 
fishery is likely to be depleted: each party will not tend to take into account the damage its  
own fishing does to the stocks of fish available to others, including the future beneficiaries of 
the fishery.  Returning to the cases, the lack of a sense of ownership by the Bajau led them to 
share their marine environment fully with commercial fishing boats.  Over-fishing has resulted, 
as the commercial boats do not take fully into account the costs their harvest imposes on the 
Bajau’s ability to harvest using their traditional techniques and the Bajau do not take fully into 
account their own harvest’s effects on the commercial take.   Indeed, without clear allocation 
of ownership or even a clear concept of ownership among the Bajau, it is not obvious how such  
externalities could be taken into account by the parties: no basis for discussion exists between 
the parties at present.
On the other hand, suppose that one party were given full  control of fishing rights in the 
fishery.  If one party wholly own the resource  – potentially in perpetuity-- then that party has 
full incentive to extract the maximum value, whether this is value in terms of current earnings, 
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future earnings, enjoyment, extraction of a livelihood, or any other monetary or non-monetary 
benefit from the resource.  As the private party stands to benefit fully from the resource, now 
and in the future, it also has full incentive to manage that resource for the current and future 
periods.  Full ownership has greater benefits than this, however.  When the private party has 
whole  ownership,  it  also  has  full  control  of  the resource and access  to  it.   Hence,  whole 
ownership  aligns the incentive of the owning party with maximizing the value of the resource; 
it  also  creates  the  ability  to  manage  both  resource  use  and  access  so  as  to  attain  that 
maximum value.  In this sense, decentralising management and ownership to the local group 
can work well to ensure that the resource is not exhausted and is also managed to maximise 
its livelihood benefits.    
How this ownership right is used is, however, crucial to whether or not full value is extracted. 
Suppose that we gave full  ownership to the Bajau who, as was stated in the case in this 
project, have little sense of what property rights mean.  It is not at all clear that they would  
enforce any exclusion of others with or without compensation, nor is it clear that they have 
sufficient knowledge of the usual institutions for enforcing property rights to be able to enforce 
them in any realistic manner.  In other words, ownership rights would only be useful to the 
Bajau if  they enforced those rights  in  the presence of continued threats  from commercial 
fleets.  If the Bajau are unlikely to enforce their rights, then giving them ownership as a way of  
ensuring wise management of the resource might not be very useful.    
A further issue is that the case states that the interests of the Bajau are oriented towards 
current extraction of fish for subsistence, in the face of a rising population.  In other words, 
while  the  Bajau  live  in  family  groups  that  would  normally  allow  current  generations  to 
understand  and  take  into  account  fully  the  needs  of  future  generations,  it  appears  that 
population pressures are resulting in a poor representation of future generations’ interests in 
the preferences of today’s Bajau.  Hence, a relevant constituency in the decision process of 
how to  manage the  resources  appears poorly  represented under  the current  organisation. 
Further,  scientific  marine  management  techniques  that  could  help  to  ensure  similar 
opportunities as today’s population enjoy in marine exploitation appear not to be accessible for 
the Bajau.  In this sense, even if they did put primacy on future generations’ needs, it is not 
clear that they have the skills necessary to do this.  Under these conditions – lack of skills and 
lack of weight placed on future generations’  needs,  it  is  not  clear that  the fishery will  be 
maintained productive in perpetuity.  Hence, it is not clear that ownership rights allocated to 
the Bajau resolves the resource management problem viewed as a bargaining problem where 
the interests of future Bajau should be taken into account.  
The Bajau face a further problem in potential negotiations over the use of marine resources, 
even assuming that there were no problem with the concept of ownership: they organise in 
insular  groups  that  do not coordinate well  across groups.   To the extent  that commercial 
fishing is concentrated in a relatively small set of hands – or at least is able to organise its 
interests  --  while  the Bajau are  a dispersed and uncoordinated set  of  independent  family 
groups, the bargaining that the Bajau conduct would likely be ineffective.  This is because each 
individual family group would have an incentive to “let others do the negotiating” so as to reap 
the benefits of negotiations without necessarily being the party to exert the effort to learn 
enough  to  conduct  the  negotiations.   Further,  each  individual  group  would  be  unlikely  to 
represent  the  interests  of  the  entire  Bajau  community.   Both  of  these  problems  with  a 
dispersed set of interests could cause bargaining inefficiencies that would reduce the value that  
the Bajau could extract from local ownership.
Moving on to other cases, the Mustonen et al’s 2011 study of the Puruvesi fishermen states 
that this group has very clear ideas of ownership, so at least this concern would not be the 
same as in the case of the Bajau.  The case suggests, however, that this group also does not 
seem to have been very effective at negotiating their way to resource use that preserves their 
cultural and livelihood value.  A problem here could be that the fishermen in question may not 
be very skilled or informed negotiators compared to other groups that wish to have access to 
the  same  resources  for  their  own  purposes.   In  order  for  ownership  to  work  to  create 
efficiency, bargaining and negotiations have to be efficient as well.  If information about the 
use to which the resource will  be put by all  parties  is  not available  or understood by the 
different parties, for example if information on pollution consequences of certain activities is 
not available to local groups, then bargaining may not occur efficiently.  Again, ownership does 
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not work on its own to ensure that local groups extract full value from the resource in such a 
case, as the bargaining that should lead to extracting full value happens subject to incomplete 
or asymmetric information that can allow parties to misrepresent their own interests so as to 
skew the bargaining results in their favour.
Hence,  the  Bajau  and  Puruvesi  studies  suggest  that  decentralisation  of  the  resource 
management to local groups is unlikely on its own to solve the resource management problem: 
the local groups may not be able to enforce their ownership rights due to lack of information or 
lack of understanding, the local group may be unable to organise so as to bargain effectively, 
and  in  any  case  the  interests  of  future  generations  may  not  be  guaranteed  under 
decentralisation. Finally, even if the society in question has a clear sense of ownership and 
institutions to enforce ownership rights, the Coase Theorem only holds when negotiations can 
be  conducted  with  low  transactions  costs.   If  property  rights  are  too  dispersed,  large 
negotiation costs can result whenever resource use issues arise since many parties need to be 
assembled to access resource rights.  Hence, how much decentralisation occurs depends in 
part on how much can be achieved whilst  still  allowing low enough negotiation costs that 
efficient resource exploitation is possible in a Coasian manner10.
Addressing  these  problems,  Cullen-Unsworth  and  Wallace’s  2011  study  of  the  Australian 
aborigines in Queensland suggests a role for government in creating a structure for ensuring 
that  ownership  is  exploited  so as  to  generate  value  efficiently.   In  the  Queensland  case, 
informed representatives work with the local group to ensure that the group speaks with a 
single  voice  in  negotiations,  and  has  the  information  and  skills  necessary  to  be  effective 
negotiators.  Resources are provided so that ownership rights can be enforced via the court 
system, with the advisors to the tribe as guides through this process.  Negotiations occur at 
the tribal level so that few points of contact exist for outsiders, minimising transaction costs. 
In this sense, the Queensland case maps out a system that addresses the issues above of (1) 
understanding  and  enforcement  of  property  rights,  (2)  informed  and  skilled  (low  cost) 
bargaining, (3) the need for the local group to speak with a unified voice, and (4) the scientific 
support needed to manage the resource for current and future generations.  Hence, if one 
wants ownership rights to transfer value to local groups, a comprehensive support system as 
in this case may be necessary for such a system to work.  It is clear from the case that such a 
complete system requires time and significant resources to establish, and also requires the 
trust of local groups.  These are demanding conditions to transfer to the other cases in this 
study: even if the system functions very efficiently once implemented, the cost, time, and skill  
necessary to establish it creates a significant ex ante opportunity cost to this type of endeavor.
The Coase theorem suggests that when a system is created, perhaps on the model of the 
Queensland case, to ensure efficient bargaining it does not matter whether the local groups 
hold full ownership of the resource or whether some external private body does.  In other 
words, once all parties have a fully informed and effective “seat” at the bargaining table, while 
who owns the resource matters to how the value is split it does not matter to how much value 
is created in total. Hence, ownership of the waters on which the Puruvesi or the Bajau do their 
fishing could be held by a commercial interest, and the land on which the aborigines live could 
be held by a private entity -- full value should still result, but the proportion of this value going 
to the local group could change.  Unfortunately, economic analysis does not give a definitive 
answer on the optimality of the various possible distributions.  Indeed, one could argue that an 
alternative  solution  to  generating  value  from resources  is  to  have  some support  for  local 
groups in bargaining, but otherwise not to transfer ownership to the local groups.  
If the value of the resource were purely monetary, then this argument could perhaps hold true. 
However, maintenance of the cultural heritage of the local group is one of the sources of value 
in all the cases that form the data for this paper.  If this value were purely a benefit to the local  
group, then the Coase theorem suggests that as long as bargaining is efficient,  this value 
would still  be maximised regardless of who owns the resource.  On the other hand, these 
cultural values are, in themselves, a resource is available to many people beyond the local 
group that creates them.  This “public good” aspect of cultural rights suggests that ownership 
by a private entity other than the local group would likely not result in maximising the cultural  
10 Indeed, much recent literature has developed on the “anticommons” – cases where overlapping property rights are 
decentralised to the point that markets become inefficient at generating value.  Pooling of rights is one solution to this  
problem, consistent with the Queensland case discussed in the text.  For a seminal exposition of “anticommons”, see  
Heller and Eisenberg (1998). 
cresi.essex.ac.uk Page 17 of 29 © 2012, University of Essex
CRESI WORKING PAPER
CWP-2012-01-Econ-Analysis-Resillience.doc
value of the resource since the cultural heritage value would remain a public good whoever 
owns the resources  that  generate  them.  Hence,  cultural  heritage as a public  good is  an 
argument that suggests local ownership with support is a better solution to maximising the 
value “broadly understood” from the resources than ownership by some other outside party. 
Indeed, the Puruvesi and Bajau cases emphasise the problems of non-ownership by the local 
group in an environment with relatively little government support and cultural heritage issues.  
5.2 Agency Issues
It should be emphasised that the solution proposed in the Queensland case is emphatically not 
a fully centralised solution.  A common objection to full  centralisation is that decentralised 
decisions tend be able to incorporate special circumstances that are known only at the local 
level.   In  other  words,  knowledge  tends  to  be  dispersed  and  difficult  to  pull  together  in 
complete form for any central authority.  A benefit of decentralisation is precisely that local 
information can be taken into account more efficiently than it might be under fully centralised 
(for example, government) management.
This support for decision-making by agents that tend to possess better information than a 
central directing body is supported by a second strand of theory in the economic literature: 
Principal-Agent theory.  In the case where a local group does not have full ownership and 
control of the resources it uses for its livelihood and to support its culture, such as the North 
Greenland case (Hayashi, 2011), or if it has ownership (or land rights) but does not have the 
resources to manage the resources itself, such as in the Queensland case (Cullen-Unsworth 
and  Wallace,  2011),  or  if  it  simply  wishes  to  delegate  to  another  negotiator  to  minimise 
transactions costs or place management in the hands of the most capable party, it must rely -- 
to some degree -- on others to manage its resources for it.  For example, imagine that the 
local group does own its resources (for example, its land) but does not have the expertise or 
resources to manage that land fully and so delegates this task to a government bureau or a 
private party.  If the local group is poorly informed about the plans (or implications of the 
plans) for resource management by the body actually doing the management then the local 
group is likely to be poorly served by this arrangement.  The reason is that the manager of the 
resources may not have exactly the same goals as the local group.  For example, even if the 
manager is a government bureaucrat, if that bureaucrat is subject to influence by parties that 
would deplete the resource excessively then the manager can undertake such depletion for its 
own gain without full knowledge by the local group.  Hence, the problem here is that, even 
with ownership by the local group, if management of the resource is conducted by a separate 
and independent body the local group’s benefits may not be fully realized if the local group 
does not have full information on the policies or implications of the policies undertaken by the 
manager.  In such a “principal-agent” relationship there is a trade-off between control, which 
would ensure exploitation aimed at the local group’s preferences albeit perhaps inefficiently 
exercised due to lack of expertise, and delegation, which ensures that those exploiting the 
resource have the required technical and commercial expertise to optimise exploitation but 
may do so to other purposes. 
The usual solution to the principal-agent problem lies in either transfer of responsibility for 
management to the owner, or in aligning the incentives of the manager and the owner by 
means of a contract or judicious choice of manager.  The contracts that aim to align incentives 
can  get  quite  sophisticated,  which  creates  another  hurdle  for  local  groups,  as  designing 
complex contracts can be an expensive proposition. Moreover, contracts only help alleviate the 
principal agent problem if they can be enforced. This presumes that some measure of the 
agent’s performance can be adequately monitored and that conflicts would be resolved quickly 
and fairly by the local judiciary. As effective monitoring might require a formal training not 
available within the local ranks and the “governance structure” of  the local judiciary might 
itself be inadequate to enforcement, delegation is likely to be less attractive. Perhaps this is 
why  the  case  studies  generally  support  both  local  ownership  and  local  management  of 
resources rather than management by any remote body.  Rather, taking the Queensland case 
(Cullen-Unsworth and Wallace, 2011) as an example, the participation of remote bodies is 
primarily in terms of legal and informational support and advice rather than active decision 
making on how the resource is managed.  Indeed, in his treatment of the trade-offs between 
centralised  and  decentralised  management  of  resources  using  a  combination  of  economic 
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approaches,  Farrell,  1987,  recommends  that  centralised  economic  institutions  such  as 
government control  and intervention,  and decentralised institutions such as bargaining and 
ownership rights, be viewed both as complementary and as “checks and balances” on each 
other.  
Of course, local ownership and management of a resource also implies that the local group’s 
fortunes will  be tied to some degree to that  resource’s  value. In other words, with direct 
control and ownership may come an increased risk borne by the owner.  Unless a stable stream 
of support is available from the resource, simple ownership may not preserve the local group 
as a viable entity.  Some form of diversification of livelihood, as emphasised by the North 
Greenland  case  (Hayashi,  2011)  or  the  Bangladeshi  case  (Bunting  et  al,  2011),  may  be 
necessary to insure against such fluctuations in livelihood.  Without some form of insurance 
against lean years or diversification of livelihood to provide a smooth consumption stream – 
plus some form of support in terms of how to manage the local resource so as to generate a 
livelihood that is likely to be resilient -- local ownership may not go far enough to ensure viable  
local cultures.  We treat insurance issues specifically in the next section.
These are significant caveats, and often mean that self-determination is not enough on its 
own.  In particular, if the local group lacks the tools, including the information, to manage their 
own resources fully, then other groups need to be brought in for assistance to the extent that 
decision making is delegated.  This risks degradation of the resource unless the local group can 
monitor the actions of the manager and impose penalties if the resources are not managed 
properly.   Independent  monitoring  is  a  possible  solution  for  this  problem,  coupled  with  a 
system of awarding damages to the local group if their resources are not managed properly. 
Either those damages can be revealed via the courts or they can be taken into account by a 
bond, payable by the manager to the owners upon detection of mis-management.   
None of the case studies used as data here appear to have a fully developed system of self-
determination in the sense of both ownership and control or a system of agency with the sorts 
of  supporting  institutions  and  monitoring  suggested  here,  although  the  Queensland  case 
probably gets as close as any to a complete system in this sense.  That case outlines an 
exceptionally  complex and well-funded “partnership” system between the indigenous group 
and the Australian government.  In the case, the indigenous group has obtained government 
funding  for  a  set  of  “rangers”  who  perform  as  stewards  --  informed  and  empowered 
spokespeople  --  for  the indigenous group,  a  system of involving indigenous  people in  the 
management structure alongside government representatives, and funding grants to support 
conservation  activities.   Even  this  system,  however,  does  not  extend  to  independent 
monitoring and damages in the case of mismanagement, at low resource cost.  The system in 
that case appears to rely on the existing legal system for dispute resolution, which would be 
quite  costly  to  use to  this  purpose.   The system does not  address  as extensive a set  of 
conflicting interests as we find in some of the other cases (such as the Bajau case), where a 
stronger centralised intervention might be necessary.  Finally, the resource demands to create 
and maintain such a system are substantial and may be beyond what other governments are 
willing to commit.  
6 RISK AND INSURANCE 
To fully understand a community’s response to a specific unexpected shock, economists would 
look  at  a  number  of  dimensions  that  are  commonly  studied  in  other  social  sciences.  For 
example, levels of trust and concepts of fairness are likely to be important determinant of the 
community’s  response,  especially  when  more  formal  lines  of  authority  and  command  are 
adversely affected by the shock.  Similarly,  social  networks and other mechanisms through 
which the community deals with issues of risk and insurance would be examined.  Finally, the 
ability of savings to absorb shocks would normally also is an area of interest.  These threads 
have  recently  been  combined  into  studies  of  risk  sharing  that  bear  upon  resilience,  as 
resilience could be conceived as the degree of “insurance” of a community against threats.  
6.1  Savings and Insurance
A standard way of “insuring” against fluctuations in income is saving.  Precautionary savings as 
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a  method  of  cushioning  shocks  is  a  standard  strategy  of  individuals  and  households11. 
Insurance extends beyond savings, however, to a large number of methods of pooling risks via 
formal and informal insurance, including government-provided insurance as well as family or 
other social  network support12.   The effectiveness and design of  these as means to assist 
regions to recover from disasters has been investigated extensively13.  Insurance mechanisms 
deal with shocks by providing for savings and resources that can be transferred to areas or 
individuals that need them in order to facilitate recovery, but do not necessarily prevent the 
effect of the shock in the first place.  Of course, incentives that are priced can be added to 
those insurance arrangements in  order to induce local  agents to take steps to reduce the 
effects of shocks or their likelihood.  
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  certain  local  insurance  (or,  more  generally  “smoothing”) 
mechanisms are present in in our data at the expense of savings as another mechanism. For 
example,  several  of  the case studies  such as the agri-food case study by Sedlmayer  and 
Boehm, 2011, and the energy provision study by Accorigi, 2011 emphasise systems that are 
currently quite costly and so may reduce the savings that would normally be expected to serve 
as a means of absorbing shocks.  For example, an (implicit) alternative solution to the peak oil 
problems,  which is  emphasised in  some of  the case studies such as Accorigi,  2011,  is  to 
continue to use oil as the cheapest current alternative, but to build up a fund to use in the 
future to cushion the effect of peak oil prices.  Hence, “insurance” of one type is bought by 
sacrificing “insurance” of another type.  
Indeed,  one  could  think  of  both  of  these  studies  as  emphasising  the  importance  of 
diversification of sourcing (of food in the case of Sedlmayer and Boehm and of energy in the 
case  of  Accorigi).   There  is  considerable  emphasis  on  diversification  of  the  sources  of 
livelihoods as a means of coping with new and unpredictable challenges in the case studies. 
This is found in the Bunting et al (2011) case study of Bangladesh, the Greenland study of 
Hayashi (2011) and in the contrast between the two valleys studied in Vihar and Doon (2011). 
In all these cases, the basic nature of the culture was rooted in a broad method of obtaining 
food  (“hunting”,  generally  defined  in  the  Greenland  study,  “coastal  aquaculture”  in  the 
Bangladesh study, and “highland farming” in the two valley Uttarakhand study), but not a 
particular  technology,  species,  or  crop.   This  allowed  diversification  strategies  in  food 
production so that, across time or even within a particular season, a variety of food sources 
could be accessed to provide a livelihood even if a particular food source became scarce or a 
technology became ineffective.  Diversification is a general strategy that, while it often has the 
downside of not allowing full exploitation of any single resource -- which may result in higher 
costs and so reduced savings -- allows for smoothing of the flow of consumption or income.  In 
this sense, diversification is like self-insurance for a community albeit  at the cost of fewer 
specialisation economies.   
The issue of the cost of achieving resilience runs through this project. As a result, while we 
have discussed some of  the  governance,  social  networks,  and insurance mechanisms that 
underlie resilience to a variety of shocks, we cannot assume that greater resilience is always 
desirable. Consider the example of unexpectedly heavy snowfall in England. The authors’ own 
experience in recent years is that the UK and its economy are not very resilient to this type of 
shock….but  what  should  be  done  about  it?  Is  it  worth  investing  more  in  snow  removal 
equipment  to  deal  with  what  remains  a  rare  occurrence?  One  reason  why  snow  is  very 
disruptive  is  that  many  workers  travel  significant  distances  to  work.  So,  in  the  name  of 
increased resilience, should we move to a society based on small self-sufficient communities? 
Clearly, such a drastic change involves significant costs even in the longer term and would not 
be feasible in the short or medium run. Because of this “cost side” of resilience, one should be 
quite careful in drawing lessons for desirable policy, transferring lessons from one country to 
the  other,  or  over time.   While  the case studies often mention the investment  needed to 
11 For example, see Kimball and Weil, 2009, and references therein.
12 For  example,  see  the  discussion  of  the  effectiveness  of  foreign aid  in  mitigating  disasters  in  Bourgignon and 
Sundberg (2007).
13 There is a huge literature in this area, including papers involving crop insurance design and effectiveness (for  
example Sherrick et al, 2004)  earthquake insurance (for example Palm, 2004),   insurance from family structure, (for  
example, Portner, 2001), health insurance (for example Asgary et al, 2004) and financial insurance (for example, Cull  
et al, 2005).  See references contained in these articles for other, including seminal, articles in these and other areas 
of insurance. 
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achieve resilience for an ecoculture, the magnitude of this expense would need to be balanced 
against  any  benefits  derived  from resilience  in  order  to  judge  accurately  whether  such a 
resilience policy would be socially desirable to pursue when weighed against other potential 
investments.  
Stabilizing mechanisms or “insurance mechanisms” have been the subject of a great deal of 
economic research on both developed and developing economies.  The mechanisms that have 
been catalogued in the literature are large, involving intertemporal mechanisms that even a 
single individual or family can practice (such as pecuniary or non-pecuniary savings, including 
storing  food  across  seasons),  diversifying  crops  held  within  a  single  family  or  across  a 
community14,  purchases  or  sale  of  assets  (like  livestock  or  land)15,  borrowing/lending16, 
gifts/transfers  from  networks17,  pulling  children  out  of  school  or  increasing  family  size, 
diversifying earning stream to both agricultural and non-agricultural sources (including migrant 
income, for example)18.  Many of these mechanisms are difficult to separate out into distinct 
groups.  For example, Banerjee and DuFlo, 2007, note that since savings cannot be held in 
bank accounts or other secure facilities  for  many of the world’s  population,  lending is the 
natural way to “save”.  In addition, such lending serves to smooth consumption of others and 
so helps to provide some kind of insurance to them.  Second, while some of these institutions, 
such as diversifying income streams outside of agriculture, have insurance implications, they 
also  serve  to  use  the  individual’s  time efficiently  and  fully  throughout  the  year.   Finally, 
intermediaries sometimes play a role in these arrangements, such as lending and borrowing 
arrangements,  but  the nature of  the  intermediation  and  at  what  scale  the  intermediation 
begins and bilateral or small multilateral arrangements end is somewhat fuzzy.  
We see a wide variety of insurance institutions represented in the case studies in this project. 
For example, we see food source diversification strategies in Sedlmayer and Boehm, 2011; 
energy source diversification strategies in Accorigi, 2011; changes in cropping pattern or crop 
mix as well as shifts among pastoral, agricultural activities, and other sources of livelihood 
such as remittances or participation in the tourism industry in Vihar and Doon, 2011; adopting 
flexible and diversified methods and aims of hunting activities in Hayashi, 2011;  credit and 
catch networks, sharing of boats and other tools, as well as reciprocal gift exchange within 
clusters and trading alliances with other land-based communities in Clifton, 2011. 
Whatever the mechanism, insurance against income fluctuations appears to be provided to a 
surprising level in many communities, including our data. Indeed, it has been observed that, 
despite  wide  fluctuations  in  income,  consumption  in  developing  countries  remains 
comparatively  stable.  While Banerjee and Duflo (2007) comment, based on empirical  and 
observational studies using a wide variety of countries, that insurance arrangements appear to 
be  neither  complete  nor  efficient,  despite  the  welfare  benefits  that  this  could  generate, 
Townsend’s (1994) work suggests that almost full  global insurance against certain types of 
shock may be obtained at  the village level.  Hence,  we may not be “far  away” from the 
optimum even if we are not fully there.  We investigate to what extent recent work indicates 
that this is the case, below.   
Much  of  the earlier  formal  insurance  literature  focused on a  model  of  interactions  among 
potentially insured individuals that was more appropriate for developed economies.  In such a 
model, (generally homogeneous) individuals can fully insure against a wide variety of risks by 
writing complete contingent contracts19.  This type of model implicitly assumes a degree of 
development in institutions such as markets and their legal framework as well as the presence 
of intermediaries to facilitate contracting among all parties to the insurance “pool” that may 
not be directly applicable to any of the cases underlying this study.  Another stream in this  
literature has focused on imperfect information flows, such as less information about relevant 
risks held by the insurer than by the insured, and heterogeneous individuals.  This stream has 
examined  characteristics  of  insurance  contracts  that  would  allow  insurers  to  reduce  risk 
14 For example, see Walker, Singh and Jodha (1983). 
15 For example, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)
16 For example, see Jodha (1978) , Bell, Srinivasan and Udry (1997), and Kochar (1997)
17 For example, see Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) and Rosenzweig (1988)
18 For example, see Banerjee and DuFlo (2007)  and references therein.
19 See Arrow (1971).
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exposure20.  
While these models provide insights into actual insurance arrangements in both developed and 
developing  countries,  they  do  not  fully  capture  the  structure  of  many  informal  insurance 
markets  which  dominate  the  case  studies  in  this  project.   In  particular,  the  assumption 
underlying these models that all  agents in a community potentially participate on an even 
footing in insurance arrangements does not square with observation.  Indeed, we have three 
insurance questions that we can pose for the case studies: one is the descriptive question of 
how the informal insurance arrangements actually work, second is the question of why and 
how such arrangements might arise as equilibrium phenomena, and third is how good these 
arrangements are: whether they can be improved for their participants by (imposing) some 
other type of design.   
In a homogeneous population model of the type described above, Genicot and Ray,  2003, note 
that the larger the group the higher the per capita utility from risk sharing so that one would 
expect that efficient insurance arrangements should be observed at the level of the community 
as a whole.  However, they comment that this is at direct odds with the observation that most 
insurance  arrangements  in  communities  (of  the  type  in  our  case  studies)  are  not  at  a 
community  level.   Indeed,  the small  or  even  bilateral  nature  of  many informal  insurance 
arrangements  has  been  noted  by  a  wide  variety  of  authors21 with  specific  arrangements 
covering the gamut we have outlined above.  
Murgai  et al,  2002,  propose that  such  balkanisation  may be  due to  the transaction  costs 
incurred when setting up an insurance network.  These include “assignment costs”, which are 
the time or other costs of establishing a link between individuals for the purposes of insurance 
and “enforcement costs”, which are the time or other costs of making the insurance contract 
“pay” in the case of a negative shock.  Indeed, the fact that many studies find that informal 
insurance networks generally contain individuals who could be linked for other natural reasons 
(for example, family members, village members, members of the same caste or occupational 
group, members of the same gender, or other subgroups) suggests that these costs are indeed 
important to determining who jointly insures, especially among populations with few resources.  
One could imagine that, to the extent that these costs are barriers to the formation of larger 
networks, management of these costs could lead to the formation of larger groups that could 
then  rely  on  larger  resource  pools  and  survive  larger  or  more wide-spread  shocks.   The 
standard way of managing this sort of cost is the establishment of intermediaries.        
Several recent papers using the techniques of social  network theory have investigated the 
theoretical characteristics of insurance networks that are composed of subgroups rather than a 
single, perhaps undifferentiated, group.  These papers address the question of whether we can 
expect  “chunky”  insurance  arrangements  to  arise  in  an organic  sense  and remain  stable. 
Genicot and Ray, 2003, note that there can be theoretical – strategic -- reasons for mutual 
insurance  groups  to  remain  small  quite  apart  from  Murgai  et  al’s  2002  transaction  cost 
reasons.  Genicot and Ray investigate insurance arrangements that are required to be stable to 
“defections”  by  groups  of  insured  individuals  who  may  depart  to  form their  own  mutual 
insurance arrangements.  Their standards generate the sort of chunky market we observe. 
More interestingly, however, Genicot and Ray, 2003, note that in their model and many other 
models of insurance (even those focusing on insurance that is stable in the face of individual 
defections), the configuration of these insurance arrangements is very sensitive to the precise 
parameters of the model.  Investigating this within their framework, they find the surprising 
result that an increase in the need for insurance (such as an increase in the natural disasters 
suffered by the community) can have the perverse effect of reducing the insurance provision 
since  the  stable  group  size  can  easily  change.   This  change  in  size  requires  existing 
arrangements to break down and new arrangements to form, which clearly would generally 
imply poor insurance coverage for a transition period and – perhaps – no improvement in 
coverage afterwards if  stable group size falls.  This cautionary note does not, it should be 
emphasized, require a change in the nature of the insurance risk that the group faces.  The 
implied fragility of the arrangements suggests a heightened need to intervene in the face of 
20 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
21 See, in addition to Udry (1994), Genicot and Ray (2003), Murgai et al (2002), Park (2006), Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003), and references within these works.  The papers in this area cover many different types of community, from 
Pakistani  (Murgai)  to  Bangladesh  (Park)  to  the  Philippines  (Fafchamps  and Lund)  and many  others,  reviewed  in 
Banerjee and DuFlo’s discussion.
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changing external threats, since indigenous arrangements may not carry over well to the new 
circumstances.  
Bloch et al, 2008, also attempt a more institution-based approach by specifying exogenously to 
their model that only bilateral insurance links can form.  Further, and probably realistically, 
individuals are not even aware of the entire network of links that cover their community: they 
only are concerned with their own “local” insurance arrangement.  The authors search for 
insurance institutions that satisfy criteria set out in the model of stability (longevity), and a 
consumption norm for the insured pairs.  The arrangements must be self-enforcing so that no 
external authority is present to impose arrangements; rather, the insurance institutions that 
arise must do so “organically”.   They find that either very thickly or very thinly connected 
networks satisfy their  requirements, suggesting that networks of the type that is observed 
(small  networks  that  are  not  well  integrated  into  the  whole)  satisfy  their  criteria  in  a 
theoretically consistent sense.  The intuition for their result  is that the network’s longevity 
relies upon ostracism as a sanction – in other words, the threat for not fulfilling insurance 
commitments is exclusion from the group.  Thinly connected groups can ostracise easily, as the 
person who is excluded is poorly connected in the first place so that relatively few complaints 
will serve to exclude the individual completely from their network.  Thickly connected groups 
also ostracise easily, as word travels very fast and very far.  Hence, the enforcement power is  
high in either of these networks and this lends each of these designs staying power.  Note that 
this enforcement regime, if it ever came into use (which it will not as long as the network 
remains in its stable state), would result in individuals who are excluded from any insurance 
arrangement.  Banerjee and Duflo, 2007, note the existence of such excluded individuals in 
their comprehensive survey.  Indeed, even in the recent discussions in the UK of changes in 
the NHS, the argument for centralised insurance provision has traditionally been to ensure that 
excluded individuals receive cover.  Local insurance arrangements, while they do not generate 
exclusion in equilibrium in such models, can generate exclusion off the equilibrium path 22.    
These theoretical papers add to the list of “why” local insurance arrangements might arise by 
showing that stability concerns generate “chunky” insurance networks that arise organically. 
These can be added to the transaction cost reasons, proposed above.  The papers cited so far 
do not argue, however, that this sort of arrangement is optimal in a wider sense.  For example, 
the earlier models that assume more connectedness among individuals implicitly assume some 
form of (trusted) intermediary that achieves this connectedness at low cost.  We could very 
well be better off with intermediaries that can reach a large number of individuals rather than 
bilateral  agreements  among  neighbours,  particularly  if  the  threats  to  the  community  are 
broad-based rather than local.  
The difficulty is that the intermediaries that we observe often are extortionate (as in the case 
of local money lenders, discussed in Banerjee and DuFlo, 2007) or otherwise are not trusted. 
Karlan  et  al,  2009,  suggest  that  family  ties  form  a  natural  “collateral”  that  facilitates 
transactions in networks and, further, the level of connectedness among individuals,  which 
generates this trust, will determine the value of transactions that the network supports where 
family  ties generate especially valuable links for  insurance purposes.  Indeed,  we see this 
reflected in the Clifton, 2011, case study in this project, where family groups based on “trust 
and obligation” form the basis of the insurance provided to the society’s members, although 
this  study also indicates that the local  gift  exchange system has existed side-by-side with 
wider trading relationships at some points in history.  Ambrus  et al, 2010, propose village 
elders as natural intermediaries for their own analysis and could perhaps be thought of as a 
good place to start in developing more complete insurance systems.                       
It is not clear how much intermediation is necessary, however, to achieve something very close 
to full insurance for certain types of threats.  Ambrus et al, 2010, pose the question of whether 
local arrangements can, in aggregate, supply good global risk-sharing where threats are in the 
form of idiosyncratic income shocks.  Note that this implies that resource constraints are not 
an issue in their paper so that the advantage of large insurance networks of pooling large 
amounts of resources is not present.  
While Ambrus et al, 2010, find that full insurance requires that all agents be connected in a 
22 Related to this, Bramoullie and Kranton (2007) find that cross-community risk sharing can increase welfare for those  
connected across villages (and in the aggregate), but tends to reduce the connectedness within villages.  This can 
reduce the welfare of peripheral individuals, so that the welfare gains are by no means evenly spread.  
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particular  and extensive way which is  not  observed in  many settings,  a  relatively  loosely 
connected  network  can  generate  “almost”  full  insurance23,  although  the  effectiveness  of 
insurance provision improves dramatically  as connectedness increases  even modestly  from 
very low levels.  This implies that for the type of threat considered, a local system can perform 
as well as the sort of global system that we could achieve with, for example, effective and 
trusted intermediaries who serve to connect all agents in a very tight way.  Further, they find 
that insurance organizes endogenously in a chunky way, with little risk sharing across chunks, 
but full risk sharing within chunks24.  In such a chunky set-up, shocks propagate much more 
locally than at a distance in the network.  Further, the local nature of risk sharing can lead to 
poor insurance for larger or more global shocks.  Hence, the real problem comes when shocks 
are  broadly-based  or  extremely  large  (so  that  an  entire  group’s  consumption  could  be 
inadequate).  In such cases, we find the informal arrangements lacking.
Wrapping up this section, insurance is important to a “resilience toolbox” because resilience 
could be conceptualised as the degree of insurance provided for a community. The literature 
combined  with  evidence  from the  cases  suggests  several  areas  where  insurance  may  be 
lacking.  First, some insurance arrangements may be quite sensitive to changes in the risk 
environment, perhaps failing to perform precisely when the nature or size of shocks changes. 
This could indicate a fragility that would require specific intervention to address.  Second, the 
types of informal arrangement that we observe perform surprisingly well to insure residents 
against shocks that are relatively small, idiosyncratic, and local but do not fare well against 
larger or more widespread shocks or those shocks requiring a large infusion of resources. 
Again, some form of intervention may be indicated in this case.  Third, exclusion may result  
from informal local mechanisms to the extent that they rely on exclusion as an enforcement 
mechanism.  To the extent that intermediaries can result  in wider or better functioning of 
insurance,  either  by  connecting  local  residents  better  into  a  larger  network  or  facilitating 
transfers  at  low  cost,  trusted  intermediaries  are  at  a  premium.   Village  elders  or  other 
individuals who command a high level of trust or have some form of social collateral that could 
be  at  stake  could  serve  well  to  organise  insurance  provision.   Finally,  small  increases  in 
connectedness in relatively unconnected societies can have disproportionate gains in terms of 
insurance.   Further  increases  after  moderate  connectedness  is  achieved  have  much more 
modest effects.
7  CREATING AN INDEX OF RESILIENCE
Any empirical  analysis  of  resilience using the statistical  techniques commonly accessed by 
economists requires a sufficient number of observations. These observations can come from 
available data sets or can be constructed from a large enough number of case studies. The 
preferred  method  is  then to  statistically  correlate  (and,  if  possible,  identify  a  causal  link) 
factors that favour or hamper resilience (right hand side variables) and measures of resilience 
(left hand side variables). This is why there are a number of studies of economic resilience to 
earthquakes (see Bruneau et al, 2003): such events are quite frequent and their effects are 
fairly  well  reported.  For example, Bruneau et al  propose a comprehensive framework that 
specifies  four  dimensions  of  community  resilience:  technical,  organisational,  social,  and 
economic, which all find potential data sources for each of these in the earthquake example. 
The measure of resilience constructed in such a study can potentially be multi-dimensional, 
including reduced probability of failure of a system, reduced consequences of failures (should 
they occur) and reduced time to recover from failure.  Which of these aspects of resilience 
23 Their results differ starkly depending on whether the risk sharing occurs in a network that is “planar” or “linear”.  
The  linear  network  has  poor  risk  sharing  properties,  while  the  plane  does  rather  well  assuming  equally  strong 
connections.  (In other words, if my husband and I are connected to our parents on both sides we do much worse in 
terms of insurance than if we are also connected to two other independent households and are connected with equally 
strong bonds as to our parents.)  Ambrus et al note that the plane can be thought of as corresponding to communities 
where households have social connections locally and in multiple directions.  In a line, individuals would have contact 
with immediate neighbours but no one else.  The plane, they argue, fits their data and may be closer to reality for  
many “village type” situations.  
24Essentially, each chunk has members who share the same consumption, but increasing chunk size trades off this 
sharing against placing the new member at the same consumption level as the rest.  It may be better to place this  
new member in a different group which shares the same level of consumption, but not the same level as the first 
chunk.  Chunk size grows with the capacity of the links.  
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receives most weight will partly depend on the objectives of the researcher or policymakers.   
The case studies underlying this project suggest that a similar methodology could be used to 
build a composite index of “resilience capacity” adapted to eco-cultures, where the coefficients 
obtained in the statistical regression discussed above could be used to determine the relative 
weights of various factors included in the index.   Based on the sort of information that is 
present in the case studies that could be formalised into input data, we could propose an index 
of resilience as a function (for simplicity, a linear function) of a set of variables that would 
include qualitative and quantitative measures.  Based on the case studies, this could include a 
measure of the susceptibility of a region to threats, including contagion from other regions, a 
measure of resource stocks that are available for short term mitigation of the shock such as 
liquid savings and physical resources that can be mobilised quickly, a measure of resource 
stocks available in the longer term such as non-liquid saving and physical resources that are 
available only with delay such as alternative crops or prey, the nature of social cohesiveness or 
social adaptability that captures the ability of human resources to be directed towards the 
threat, a measure of external support available to the region, and a measure of integration of 
the region including in or out-migration, transport links, and linguistic integration.  A measure 
of governance that reflects the ability to control and manage resources and human response 
would need to be included in the index.  
As a note on this sort of equation and its relation to the four areas that Bruneau et al, 2003, 
suggest for inclusion while it is clear that organisational, social and economic issues have been 
incorporated into the index of the previous paragraph certain proxies, it is less clear what the 
role of technology is.  Indeed, the underlying technology of the community enters into this 
equation in a number of ways.  For example, the Bajau case study (Clifton, 2011) emphasises 
the  importance  of  the  fishing  technology  of  the  community  in  creating  susceptibility  to 
environmental degradation and competition: in the face of mechanised fishing by outsiders and 
pollution, with its consequent depletion of marine stocks, the Bajau’s traditional hook and line 
technology is performing less and less well at providing subsistence yields.  On the other hand, 
technology can be a resource to allow recovery, and enters into the Bajau case study as a 
solution,  not  just  as  a  cause  of  environmental  problems.   Modern  marine  management 
techniques to counteract loss of mangrove stands, water pollution, and respond to threats 
commercial fishing could all have a technological as well as a regulatory dimension.  One finds 
an echo of this sort of two-edged nature of technology in the Bunting et al (2011) Bangladesh 
study as well.          
Armed with such a specification, data on each of the variables (which are largely qualitative)  
would need to be constructed for a relatively large number of cases in order to use regression 
techniques  to  estimate  the  weights  to  be  given  to  each  factor  with  enough  reliability. 
Combining the case studies accessed here with other studies of resilience, then, could result in 
a meta-analysis that  could  generate  a useful,  well-grounded resilience index.   Clearly,  the 
current study provides a start but not an end to this process.  Clearly, too, the conclusions of 
such a piece of work are specific  to the definitions,  measures, and concerns used as was 
indicated earlier in our discussion of quantitative implementation of the resilience concept.
8 CONCLUSION
Recent work on resilience has drawn attention to the lack of clarity in the literature on the 
concept.  This lack of clarity can be an impediment to developing policy in this area.  More 
precisely recent work, such as Musson (2011), has underlined the importance that actors place 
on the opportunity cost of resilience policy when deciding whether to support it.  Without a 
clear definition of what resilience means, this opportunity cost is extremely hard to define.  
This paper has attempted a synthesis framework for analysing resilience from an economics 
viewpoint.   Much  of  the  literature  on  resilience  has  come  from  other  fields,  and  so  the 
frameworks developed in those areas need to be adapted somewhat to incorporate economics 
concerns.  Specifically, we have argued that short term considerations should receive weight in 
resilience  analysis.   Structural  considerations  have  received  weight  in  some  definitions, 
whereas we argue that performance considerations should trump these in economic analysis of 
resilience.  Finally, we have argued that, in addition to specifying what performance level we 
must return to, an implementable definition of resilience must specify relatively precisely the 
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source of shocks to which the society needs to be resilient and the measure of both the shock 
and the performance.  This specification must be rather precise: observation suggests that 
many resilience policies are quite specific to the shock and measure used.  Hence, roughly 
stating “we want resilience to climate change” is not generally enough to give a guide to policy 
or to the evaluation of  opportunity cost:  we would  need to know which precise effects of 
climate change we wish to consider, including whether the change is large (a reversal of the 
Gulf Stream) or small (a modest increase in frequency of high winds).  
Governance and insurance issues figured prominently in the case studies we reviewed.  In 
particular,  they  have  generally  supported  delegation  of  control  and  ownership  of  property 
rights to local authorities in many cases.  On the other hand, they have underlined the crucial 
role  central  authorities  can  play  in  disseminating  information,   smoothing  bargaining  and 
negotiations processes in deciding on how resources are managed, and setting up dispute and 
enforcement  institutions.   A  wide  variety  of  insurance  mechanisms  seem  available  and 
accessed by local communities to generate resilience.  These mechanisms can be very efficient 
at dealing with idiosyncratic  shocks, but require additional  support to deal with larger and 
more widespread disturbances.  Further, informal methods of insurance can rely on exclusion 
for their effectiveness, so that the distributional characteristics of these types of insurance may 
not be desirable even if their efficiency characteristics are good.         
Clearly, this paper only makes a start at mapping out resilience analysis. One of the challenges 
to actual policy makers, for example, is that the source of the shock is important to generating 
specific policy recommendations but is often unknown.  While our general recommendations 
apply regardless of the source of shock, clearly in such a case specific techniques would need 
to  be used  to  allow for  policy  to  be  generated despite  this  lack  of  information.   Clearly, 
quantitative techniques apply most directly to those shocks that can be identified with more 
precision;  however,  real  options  analysis  can  be  used  to  incorporate  concerns  over  small 
probability but catastrophic events.  While such quantitative and qualitative techniques exist to 
deal with a lot of the more difficult aspects of resilience analysis, Accorigi, 2009, exhaustively 
points out that all these techniques have significant drawbacks.  Resilience policy is, in large 
part, a matter of “doing the best we can with the tools at hand” whilst waiting for better tools 
to emerge.
As a final note, the economic approach mapped out here certainly does not provide a policy 
recommendation that resilience is something we should be favouring above other social goals. 
Standard economic tools are available to evaluate policies that lead to resilience within a larger 
policy debate.  Indeed, a menu of decision rules on which policy among many to accept is 
relatively well established, with cost-benefit analysis being a standard technique25.  The issue 
to be considered outside of the realm of economics is whether resilience should be given added 
weight beyond what it usually would receive in a cost-benefit analysis in order to give it more 
prominence in policy decisions.  In other words, as an example, speedy recovery of a system 
will normally give rise to a larger stream of discounted benefits than a system without speedy 
recovery.  Whether we should give this an even larger role by means of weighting the speed of 
recovery itself is an issue to be discussed in how to incorporate resilience as a concern into 
policy analysis.  Economics itself cannot provide guidance on this matter, even though it can 
help to implement policy preferences once they have been defined.       
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